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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. is the world’s largest importer of seafood,1 importing
virtually every fish sold in the U.S. market.2 Trade statistics do not
break down the percentage of imported wild harvested fish,3 but a re-
cent study estimated that twenty to thirty-two percent are caught
illegally.4 Trade in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fisheries
undermines efforts to conserve fish stocks,5 generates global annual
losses of up to twenty-three billion dollars, and weakens economic op-
portunity for U.S. fishermen.6 To ensure that seafood sold in the U.S. is
caught legally, on June 17, 2014, the President established a Presiden-
tial Task Force on Combating IUU Fishing (Task Force) and directed
all U.S. agencies charged with overseeing the supply chain to enforce
IUU fishing regulations.7 The extent of this mandate is unclear, since
most U.S. regulations are unenforceable abroad and the initial seafood
suppliers are overseas.
1. World Fish Trade to Set New Records, FOOD & AGRI. ORG. OF THE U.N., (Feb. 21,
2014), http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/214442/icode/ [hereinafter World Fish Trade]
(listing the top three importers in 2013: U.S - $19.0 billion, Japan - $15.3 billion, and China
- $8.0 billion).
2. See generally FishWatch U.S. Seafood Facts, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AD-
MIN. (NOAA), http://www.fishwatch.gov/farmed_seafood/outside_the_us.htm (last visited
Aug. 30, 2015).
3. Id.
4. Ganapathiraju Pramod et al., Estimates of Illegal and Unreported Fish in Seafood
Imports to the USA, 48 Marine Pol’y 102–13 (2014), available at http://www.sciencedirect
.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X14000918.
5. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, FOOD & AGRI. ORG. OF THE
U.N., http://www.fao.org/fishery/iuu-fishing/en (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
6. Barack Obama, Presidential Memorandum-Comprehensive Framework to Combat
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As the world’s largest importer of seafood,8 the U.S. must en-
sure fish from unwanted fishing practices are not entering the U.S.
market. Once the IUU fish are caught, they are combined with legally
caught fish, making them indistinguishable from the rest when im-
ported into the U.S.9 While the U.S. has strict policies to combat IUU
fishing activities, no such policies exist to deter the trade in IUU fish-
eries. The current U.S. trade controls may be described as “absent”
compared to the controls implemented by the European Union.10 In-
deed, the Task Force recently made fifteen recommendations that “are
broad in scope and call on agencies to take concrete and specific actions
to combat IUU fishing . . . throughout the seafood supply chain.”11
Without proper controls, it is plausible that IUU seafood has entered
the U.S. market and enjoyed zero tariffs under free trade agreements
(FTAs).
Illegal trade in fisheries also jeopardizes the food supply and
source of income of many people around the world.12 People like Julian
Rivas, a Colombian fisherman who has fished the Eastern Tropical Pa-
cific Seascape (ETPS)13 for two decades, are concerned14 about a
dramatic decrease in catch that results from IUU fishing.15 Since the
goal of eliminating IUU fishing and the management of marine re-
sources involves several actors,16 states “shall” cooperate—directly or
through regional fisheries management organizations/arrangements
(RFMO/As)—to adopt marine conservation and management measures
8. World Fish Trade, supra note 1.
9. Pramod et al., supra note 4.
10. Id.
11. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA) ET AL., PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COM-
BATING IUU FISHING AND SEAFOOD FRAUD, ACTION PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE TASK FORCE
RECOMMENDATIONS (Mar. 15, 2015), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/noaa_task
force_report_final.pdf. This paper analyses some of the mechanisms that the Presidential
Task Force recently adopted, but the proposals articulate such mechanisms in a different
way.
12. World Fish Trade, supra note 1.
13. Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape Project, U.N. EDUC., SCIENTIFIC, & CULTURAL
ORG., http://whc.unesco.org/en/seascape/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
14. Javier Herrera Silva, La Reivindicación de los Pescadores del Chocó, EL TIEMPO
(June 29, 2013), http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12900038.
15. See generally Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, supra note 5.
16. Rüdiger Wolfrum, President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
The potential of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the management and
conservation of marine living resources 2-3, Presentation to the Meeting of the Friends of
the Tribunal at the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations in New York
(June 21, 2007), available at https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/statements_of_
president/wolfrum/friends_tribunal_210607_eng.pdf.
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(CMMs).17 In fact, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador (the
CMAR’ States) signed the San Jose Declaration in 200418 to cooperate
to promote the ETPS.19 Since then, they have adopted numerous
CMMs to protect their marine resources relevant to the ETPS.20 The
problem is that vessels continue to IUU fish in this region due to the
lack of cooperation between the CMAR’ States and their poor levels of
law enforcement.21
An aggravating factor is the fact that flag states fail to super-
vise and control vessels.22 For instance, Panama, Colombia, and
Ecuador failed to supervise the vessels that violated the CMMs of the
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC).23 This RFMO is
aimed to protect tuna stocks in a region that includes the ETPS’ adja-
cent high seas,24 but vessels continue to fish for tuna in violation of the
IATTC’s CMMs, because the levels of transparency in some developing
States are not optimal. Moreover, the instruments creating RFMO/As
and similar mechanisms are not always binding upon states, thereby
preventing the enforcement of their CMMs within their territory and
the application of the Lacey Act to regulate conduct overseas.
The Lacey Act is the most important domestic law to prevent
and deter the trade in IUU fisheries. Although its coverage was ex-
panded since 1935 to include “foreign laws,”25 it is still unclear
whether the violations of CMMs that states take directly or through
17. See U.N. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UNCLOS Re-
lating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, arts. 6-8, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 97 [hereinafter UNFSA].
18. Declaración de San José para el Corredor Marino de Conservación del Pacı́fico Este
Tropical entre las Islas Coco, Galápagos, Malpelo, Coiba, Gorgona at 7 (Nos. 1 and 3) [San
Jose Declaration for the conservation of the Marine Corridor of the East Tropical Pacific the
Islands of Coco, Galápagos, Malpelo, Coiba, Gorgona], Apr. 2, 2004, Colom.-Costa Rica-Ec-
uador-Pan [hereinafter the San Jose Declaration]. This paper does not advocate that the
CMAR is an RFMA.
19. Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape Project, supra note 13.
20. See, e.g., Project “Strengthening Monitoring and Control to Reduce Illegal, Unre-
ported and Unregulated Fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape (ETPS)”, MARVIVA,
http://www.marviva.net/index.php/en/proyects/colombia/marviva-o5 (last visited Aug. 30,
2015).
21. OSWALDO ROSERO, WILDAID, INC., AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT CHAIN IN
THE EASTERN TROPICAL PACIFIC SEASCAPE 72 (2010), available at http://www.wildaid.org/
sites/default/files/resources/Law%20Enforcement%20Chain%20ETPS_0.pdf.
22. See generally Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, supra note 5.
23. Ecuador will not be addressed in this paper because it is not a party to an FTA with
the U.S.
24. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), FAO FISHERIES & AQUACUL-
TURE DEP’T, http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/iattc/en (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
25. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and Application of 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3371 to 3378, Enacted by Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. 97-79, Nov. 16, 1981, 95
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RFMO/As, such as the violations mentioned in this paper, would trig-
ger the application of the Act. Indeed, the market participants who
traded in seafood caught by IUU fishing vessels flagged to the three
parties to U.S. FTAs—Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia—were not
punished.
In addition to domestic laws, seafood ecolabels and the FAO
Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA) may prevent IUU fisheries
from entering the market. However, the seafood industry strives to se-
cure low-cost seafood supplies26 such as IUU fish, and most states have
yet to implement effective port state measures. Despite having zero
tariffs, the seafood industry declines to obtain voluntary seafood eco-
labels such as the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC),27 which has not
been widely implemented in Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia. These
states also do not cooperate to close their ports to all IUU fishing ves-
sels. By closing their ports, vessels travel longer distances and reduce
the value of their IUU catch.28 The PSMA may strengthen their coop-
eration, but it cannot be enforced unless incorporated into domestic
legislation.29 However, Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia have yet to
ratify the Agreement.30
Part I of this paper explains the role of different actors in the
trade of duty-free IUU fish and how IUU catches may enter the U.S.
market due to the states’ failure to implement mechanisms that allow
the U.S. to monitor fishing activities and landing of fish. It then high-
lights the issues of non-cooperation, law enforcement, and
transparency displayed in IUU fishing incidents of three parties to
U.S. FTAs—Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia—where vessels contra-
vened CMMs of a RFMO, and CMMs of two of the CMAR’s states. Part
II outlines key elements of three international instruments—Coopera-
tive Environmental Clauses of FTAs, FAO Guidelines for ecolabelling
of wild fish, and the PSMA—that, despite their non-binding effect, may
Stat. 1073, Governing Control of Illegally Taken Fish and Wildlife, 69 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 189
(2012).
26. Pramod et al., supra note 4.
27. Labelling and Certification, FAO FISHERIES & AQUACULTURE DEP’T, http://www.fao
.org/fishery/topic/13293/en (last visited Aug. 30, 2015) (addressing the reasons eco-labels
have not been implemented).
28. DAVID J. DOULMAN & JUDITH SWAN, FAO FISHERIES & AQUACULTURE CIRCULAR NO.
1074, A GUIDE TO THE BACKGROUND AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2009 FAO AGREEMENT ON
PORT STATE MEASURES TO PREVENT, DETER AND ELIMINATE ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UN-
REGULATED FISHING 1 (2012), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/015/i2590e/i2590e00
.pdf.
29. Port State Measures Agreement, FAO FISHERIES & AQUACULTURE DEP’T, http://www
.fao.org/fishery/topic/166283/en (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
30. Id.
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prevent IUU fisheries from entering foreign markets. These instru-
ments are examined in light of the states’ duties to cooperate to protect
the environment in FTAs, and to protect the marine environment in
UNCLOS.
Part III proposes a carrot and stick solution to the trade in IUU
fisheries problem. First, it proposes that FTAs be used to compel the
seafood industry to obtain seafood ecolabels to benefit from preferen-
tial tariffs and use cooperative environmental clauses of FTAs to
induce action to enhance the port controls of states parties to FTAs.
Second, it proposes that the Lacey Act can deter the trade in IUU fish-
eries through the likelihood of punishment; however, it must be
amended to include CMMs of RFMO/As as a source that can trigger the
Act. IUU fishing vessel lists of RFMO/As will then become an impor-
tant tool to initiate proceedings under the Act, as well as the National
Marine Fisheries Services’ (NMFS) Biennial Reports gathering infor-
mation on IUU lists of RFMOs.
I. TRADE IN IUU FISHERIES AND IUU FISHING ACTIVITIES
The process of importing seafood into the U.S. is very complex,
and any action taken by one member of the seafood supply chain can
affect the entire chain.31 Being able to trace the product from the point
of catch to the final consumer is necessary for sustainable seafood, but
full traceability is often lacking.32 Despite how many CMMs the states
adopt, either directly or through RFMO/As, poor levels of law enforce-
ment, non-cooperation, and lack of transparency continue to pose
daunting challenges for full traceability of seafood imports from states
such as Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia. These challenges increase
the likelihood that IUU fish have entered the markets of these state
parties to FTAs to be exported.
A. A Typical Duty Free IUU Fish Supply Chain: Lack of Trace-Back
Procedures, Landing Controls, and U.S Trade Measures
In 2011, U.S. market participants competed with seafood im-
ports that included twenty to thirty-two percent of IUU fisheries,33 as
31. See generally NANCY VALLEJO ET AL., THE ROLE OF SUPPLY CHAINS IN ADDRESSING
THE GLOBAL SEAFOOD CRISIS, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (2009), available
at http://www.unep.ch/etb/publications/Fish%20Supply%20Chains/UNEP%20fish%20sup
ply%20chains%20report.pdf.
32. See id. (discussing the lack of traceability in the seafood supply chain); see also
Pramod et al., supra note 4.
33. Pramod et al., supra note 4.
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\10-2\FAM203.txt unknown Seq: 7 22-APR-16 13:16
2015 FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE LACEY ACT 355
the seafood supply chains are often hard to trace.34 These chains are
comprised of fishers, agents, processors, distributors, and wholesalers
who work together to supply seafood to the final consumer.35 The
length of these supply chains depends on whether the fisheries are for
domestic consumption or exports, and on the harvesting techniques.36
Despite their differences, they all share a framework37 that allows IUU
fish to be concealed.38
The framework of captured wild fisheries consists of fishermen
who harvest the fish and then deliver it to intermediaries39 that trans-
port it to its final destination. In Colombia, for example, industrial and
small-scale vessels conduct fishing.40 Industrial vessels export all
catches.41 Some small-scale vessels have motors that provide a greater
range to catch larger fish stocks that are often sold to increase indus-
trial production and for export.42 The problem is that, in the past few
years, small-scale vessels conducted IUU fishing activities in jurisdic-
tional waters of Costa Rica and Colombia, as well as industrial vessels
flagged to Panama and Colombia in the high seas, and these catches
were possibly exported to the U.S.43
These vessels then deliver their catch, including illegal fish,44 to
intermediaries.45 Historically, small-scale fishermen in developing
states have lacked suitable distribution facilities,46 so fish traders have
provided an assured market outlet to small-scale seafood47 that may
include IUU fisheries.48 These fisheries, for the most part, increase the
industrial production in nations such as Colombia,49 and enter the U.S.
34. Id.
35. VALLEJO ET AL., supra note 31.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Pramod et al., supra note 4.
39. VALLEJO ET AL., supra note 31.
40. ALBA LUCÍA CEDIEL PARRA ET AL., DIAGNÓSTICO DE LAS PRINCIPALES PESQUERÍAS DEL
PACÍFICO COLOMBIANO, FUNDACIÓN MARVIVA 34-35 (Juan Dı́az et al. eds., 2011).
41. Id. at 34.
42. Structure of the Fisheries and Aquaculture Sector, FAO (Nov. 2003), http://www.fao
.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/COL/profile.htm.
43. For further discussion of these incidents, see infra Part I.B.
44. Pramod et al., supra note 4.
45. VALLEJO ET AL., supra note 31.
46. A.F. MEDINA PIZZALI, FAO FISHERIES DEPARTMENT, SMALL-SCALE FISH LANDING
AND MARKETING FACILITIES (1988), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/t0388e/
T0388E01.htm.
47. Id.
48. Pramod et al., supra note 4.
49. PARRA ET AL., supra note 40.
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market, because some developing nations export most catches due to
their high commercial value and demand in the international
market.50
To deal with the IUU fishing problem, the United Nations (UN)
has encouraged all nations to include port state measures (PSMs) in
their domestic legislation,51 but Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia
have yet to implement the PSMs that the UN proposes.52 Although the
UN FAO Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA) allows them to
verify that foreign-flagged vessels seeking permission to enter their
ports have not IUU fished, these states have yet to deposit their instru-
ments of ratification.53 The UN has also encouraged ecolabels that
certify the sustainable use of marine resources.54 The MSC is one of
the most respected trace-back programs55 and has been implemented
in some developing countries.56 In Costa Rica, however, only two com-
panies are MSC certified; Panama and Colombia each have only one
MSC certification.57
The reluctance to employ PSMs and seafood ecolabels has un-
doubtedly made it more difficult for the U.S. to verify the initial source
in the supply chain. Once IUU fisheries enter the foreign market, ex-
porters and importers transport it through international borders58 in
bulk shipments of legal and illegal fish.59 A foreign party exports the
fish from overseas to a U.S. importer who makes the import declara-
50. Id. at 34-35 (noting that, in Colombia, the industrial catch is to be exported, and
the most valuable catch by small vessels goes to increase the industrial production to be
exported); see also Structure of the Fisheries and Aquaculture Sector, supra note 42.
51. Port State Measures Agreement, supra note 29.
52. Agreements on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unre-
ported and Unregulated Fishing, FAO, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/
037s-e.pdf (last updated Oct. 28, 2015).
53. Id.
54. FAO, GUIDELINES FOR THE ECOLABELLING OF FISH AND FISHERY PRODUCTS FROM
MARINE CAPTURE FISHERIES 1 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/
i1119t/i1119t.pdf [hereinafter FAO GUIDELINES].
55. JENNIFER GEE, EVIDENCE ON UTILIZATION OF THE FAO DRAFT EVALUATION FRAME-
WORK AND THE ECONOMIC IMPACT FROM ECOLABELLING ON RETURNS TO THE FISHERIES
SECTOR 7 (Feb. 2014), available at http://www.fao.org/cofi/39786-070dcef7a66900b166177c9
7547890ab1.pdf.
56. Ecolabelling in Fisheries Management, FAO FISHERIES & AQUACULTURE DEP’T,
http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/12283/en (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
57. Find a Supplier, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL (MSC), http://cert.msc.org/sup-
plierdirectory (last visited Aug. 30, 2015) (providing an interactive tool to find businesses
with MSC certificates for sustainable seafood).
58. See generally VALLEJO ET AL., supra note 31.
59. Pramod et al., supra note 4.
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tion and pays the duties60 that, for the most part, have been eliminated
under the U.S. FTAs with Costa Rica, Panama, and Colombia.61 Un-
less and until the U.S. can verify that the initial source in the supply
chain was sustainably caught, there is a high probability that seafood
of “mixed origin”62 is entering the U.S. market, because the U.S. trade
controls are insufficient to detect IUU fisheries.63
The U.S. continues to rely upon importers to verify the tracea-
bility of fisheries from the point of catch to the final consumer, but
traceability involves coordinated action from all market participants.64
Import transactions are conducted at ports of entry where Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) enforces import regulations.65 When a
shipment reaches the U.S., the importer files entry documents and
CBP examines the goods and documents.66 Neither CBP nor importers
can develop a “reasonable care” checklist to cover every trade, but it is
assumed that their relationship is based on “informed compliance,”
wherein CBP communicates the trade requirements and the importers
comply with U.S. laws with reasonable care.67 So, it is essentially left
to the importers to verify that IUU fish were not concealed with le-
gally-captured fish.68
60. An exporter is “the party who makes (or on whose behalf an agent or broker makes)
the export declaration. The exporter sells its goods to someone in another country, known as
the importer.” Exporter, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/ex-
porter.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). An importer is “the party who makes (or on whose
behalf an agent or broker makes) the import declaration, and who is liable for the payment
of duties (if any) on the imported goods.” Importer, BUS. DICTIONARY, http://www.business-
dictionary.com/definition/importer.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
61. Free Trade Agreements, DEP’T OF COMMERCE INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://trade.gov/
fta/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2015) (listing the U.S. FTA partner nations, and a link to the FTA
tariff tool where tariffs can be verified).
62. See Pramod et al., supra note 4 (addressing the concept of seafood of “mixed ori-
gin”). See generally Robin Mcdowell et al., AP Investigation: Are Slaves Catching the Fish
You Buy?, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 25, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/cc08a86b92694f
74a12b639326d93de2/ap-investigation-are-slaves-catching-fish-you-buy (noting that fisher-
ies caught by illegal means, such as slavery, are being mixed with other legally caught fish
to be exported to the U.S.).
63. See Pramod et al., supra note 4.
64. See generally VALLEJO ET AL., supra note 31.
65. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP), IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES




68. See generally Pramod et al., supra note 4.
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B. IUU Fishing by Three Parties to U.S. Free Trade Agreements
1. Violations of Conservation and Management Measures
of Two Parties
Since every state may enact its own regulations to protect
marine resources in its jurisdictional waters,69 the IUU fishing defini-
tion includes illegal fishing activities by vessels in waters under the
jurisdiction of another state without its permission or in contravention
of its laws.70 To illustrate, the parties to the 2004 San Jose Declaration
established the Corredor Marino del Pacifico Este Tropical (CMAR) to
cooperate,71 direct, and pursue the ETPS’ initiative,72 but each state is
sovereign to regulate fishing activities and to enforce such regulations
in their EEZs73 and territorial waters,74 including IUU fishing regula-
tions. Since 2004, the CMAR States have recognized the importance of
the islands and surrounding waters of Galapagos, Cocos, Coiba, and
Malpelo75 through numerous CMMs. The islands and surrounding wa-
ters of Costa Rica and Colombia, for instance, are marine protected
areas76 where fishing activities are restricted;77 however, IUU fishing
continues to threaten their rich biodiversity and high productivity.78
Between 2011 and 2014, more than 27,000 pounds of IUU fish
were confiscated, and 52 foreign vessels were reported as having en-
gaged in IUU fishing in the jurisdictional waters of Colombia relevant
69. YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 222 (2012).
70. FAO, INTERNATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION TO PREVENT, DETER, AND ELIMINATE, ILLE-
GAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING 2-3 (2001), available at http://www.fao.org/
docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.htm [hereinafter IPOA-IUU]. See also 50 C.F.R. § 300.201
(2015) for the U.S. definition of illegal fishing.
71. San Jose Declaration, supra note 18 (Nos. 6 and 7).
72. Id.
73. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, art.
56(1)(a), 1833 U.N.T.S. 418 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
74. See generally id. arts. 2, 25, and 33.
75. See Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape Project, supra note 13; see also ROSERO,
supra note 21.
76. See generally RAY HILBORN & ULRIKE HILBORN, OVERFISHING, WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW 105-06 (2012) (defining MPAs, MPAs’ levels of protection and the effects of
closing such areas).
77. What are Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)?, PROTECT PLANET OCEAN, http://www
.protectplanetocean.org/collections/introduction/introbox/mpas/introduction-item.html (last
visited Aug. 30, 2015).
78. Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape Project, supra note 13 (listing the major threats
to the ETPS’ marine ecosystem).
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to the CMAR.79 In Colombia, it was also reported that 22 foreign ves-
sels with 11 tons of IUU fish collectively were detained,80 and marine
biologists denounced a massacre of 2,000 sharks by foreign-flagged ves-
sels, presumably from Costa Rica.81 Numerous IUU fishing incidents
were also reported in Costa Rica.82 Nationals of Nicaragua captained
some of the detained IUU fishing vessels,83 and at least one was flag-
ged to Panama.84 Costa Rican officials declared that at least twenty-
five vessels were detained near Coco Island85 and presented a list of
recidivist vessels that were not punished.86 It is imperative that every-
one engaging in IUU fishing activities in jurisdictional waters relevant
to the CMAR be punished in order to attain the goals of the San Jose
Declaration.87
The extent to which the CMAR states have deterred future IUU
fishing for the past eleven years is disappointing. There is little collab-
79. Domestic IUU fishing vessel lists are almost non-existent in Colombia, but several
agencies, non-governmental entities, and the media have reported numerous IUU fishing
incidents providing insight into the IUU fishing situation. See Inmovilizan Siete Barcos por
Pesca Ilegal, EL NUEVO SIGLO (May 29, 2014 6:32 AM), http://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/arti
culos/5-2014-inmovilizan-siete-barcos-por-pesca-ilegal.html; Inmovilizan Cinco Embarcaci-
ones Extranjeras Pescando Ilegalmente en Aguas Colombianas, EL ESPECTADOR (Aug. 4,
2014 11:32 AM), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/inmovilizan-cinco-embarca-
ciones-extranjeras-pescando-il-articulo-508486; Once Ecuatorianos y Cuatro Embarcaciones
Detenidas con Pesca Ilegal en el Pacı́fico Colombiano, ANDES (Feb. 20, 2013 3:15 PM), http://
www.andes.info.ec/es/judicial/once-ecuatorianos-cuatro-embarcaciones-detenidas-pesca-ile-
gal-pac%C3%ADfico-colombiano.html.
80. Armada Retiene Dos Barcos Ecuatorianos por Pesca Ilegal, Noticias RCN (Aug. 27,
2013), http://www.noticiasrcn.com/nacional-justicia/armada-retiene-dos-barcos-ecuatoria-
nos-pesca-ilegal.
81. David Sanz, Masacre en un Santuario de Tiburones de Colombia, ECOLOGÍA VERDE
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.ecologiaverde.com/masacre-en-un-santuario-de-tiburones-de-co-
lombia; see also Detienen Embarcación que Realizaba Pesca Ilegal en el Pacifico
Colombiano, AGENCIA EFE (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/
detienen-embarcacion-que-realizaba-pesca-ilegal-en-el-pacifico-colombiano/20111016/nota/
1563082.aspx.
82. See infra notes 83-86.
83. Guardacostas Captura Barco por Presunta Pesca Ilegal en Isla del Coco, INFORMA-
TIVO JBS (Mar. 13, 2014), http://informativojbs.com/guardacostas-captura-barco-por-presun
ta-pesca-ilegal-en-isla-del-coco/.
84. Capturan un Barco Panameño con 12 Toneladas de Atún en la Isla Coco en Costa
Rica, LOBOESTEPARIO (Jan. 31, 2008), https://loboestepariok.wordpress.com/2008/01/31/cap-
turan-un-barco-panameno-con-12-toneladas-de-atun-en-la-isla-coco-en-costa-rica/.
85. Especies de la Isla del Coco son Perseguidas por Embarcaciones Pesqueras, CR HOY
(Oct. 14, 2012), http://www.crhoy.com/especies-de-la-isla-del-coco-son-perseguidas-por-em-
barcaciones-pesqueras/.
86. Piratas Campeones en Ingresos Ilegales la Isla del Coco: Los Barcos Albatros,
Franju III y Chaday 1, PRETOMA (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.pretoma.org/es/espanol-
piratas-campeones-en-ingresos-ilegales-la-isla-del-coco-los-barcos-albatros-franju-iii-y-
chaday-1/.
87. See generally ROSERO, supra note 21.
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oration among these states in the exercise of control over their vessels.
Vessels flagged to these states, particularly to Ecuador,88 often operate
illegally in waters belonging to neighbor states due to their poor levels
of law enforcement.89 Costa Rica and Colombia, for instance, have par-
ticularly struggled to deter IUU fishing. A recent study from a non-
governmental organization found that many cases in a Costa Rican
city were dropped due to ambiguities in fisheries laws.90 Indeed, from
seventy cases, only seven were prosecuted.91 It also found that proce-
dures for the collection of evidence in Colombia were ineffective, so
cases for IUU fishing were not opened and the offenders were released
because there is a considerable institutional instability in the fisheries
sector92 and statutes of limitations are often missed.93 Unless the
CMAR States genuinely cooperate and improve law enforcement is-
sues, the U.S. market participants will continue to be prevented from
verifying that IUU fish are not concealed with legally caught fish to be
exported to the U.S. Until then, the CMAR will continue to be nothing
other than a meaningless “arrangement.”
2. Violations of Measures of a Regional Fisheries
Management Organization
The illegal fishing definition also includes vessels flying the flag
of a state party to an RFMO that conduct fishing activities in violation
of regional CMMs or that undertake fishing activities in the area of
competence of a relevant RFMO in contravention of the reporting pro-
cedures of that organization.94 Other potentially serious illegal
activities such as fraud and corruption expand the scope of this tradi-
tional definition.95 These range from the payment of bribes to continue
IUU fishing without punishment to conflicts of interest between gov-
88. Because the U.S. does not have an FTA with Ecuador, this paper is limited to Costa
Rica, Panama, and Colombia.
89. ROSERO, supra note 21.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. (providing an overview of the current fisheries’ authority that suggests the
Legislative and Executive have strongly disagreed on this subject to the point that the Con-
stitutional Court had to intervene).
93. CONTRALORIA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA, INFORME DE AUDITORIA-AUNAP 26 (June
2013), available at http://www.contraloriagen.gov.co/web/guest/agropecuario-2012 [herein-
after CONTRALORIA REPORT].
94. IPOA-IUU, supra note 70, at 2.
95. Projects, INTERPOL, http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/
Projects/Project-Scale (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
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ernment officials and the seafood industry.96 The corrective actions
adopted by Panama and Colombia for IUU fishing violations of the
CMMs of the IATTC raise awareness about this expanded definition of
IUU fishing.
Between 2009 and 2011, many vessels flagged to Panama and
Colombia IUU fished in a manner that violated CMMs of the IATTC.97
The U.S. Government notified Panama that one of its vessels fished
without a proper registry.98 Panama then imposed a $500,000 fine on
this vessel.99 It also suspended the fishing registry to a recurrent ves-
sel and ordered it to pay $704,930.100 This vessel left Panama’s registry
to evade its obligations, so Panama recommended it to be added to IUU
lists of RFMOs, because it re-flagged to Ecuador.101 Thus, vessels
reflagging to other states may undermine the effectiveness of these
sanctions.102
Colombia was also notified that Colombia-flagged vessels fished
without a registry, but Colombia took a different approach.103 To avoid
a U.S. negative certification, Colombia created Autoridad Nacional de
Acuicultura y Pesca (AUNAP)104 and transferred to it authority over
fisheries, as well as activities in regulation, registration, monitoring,
surveillance, and research on fisheries resources.105 AUNAP was also
granted authority to deny requests for the renewal offishing licenses
for the vessels that fished without the IATTC’s registry.106 Because
these vessels alleged that they violated IATTC due to the lack of the
96. MAIRA MARTINI, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREG-
ULATED FISHING AND CORRUPTION 5-6 (2013), available at http://www.transparency.org/
whatwedo/answer/illegal_unreported_and_unregulated_fishing_and_corruption (address-
ing the issue of corruption in the seafood supply chain in Africa).
97. NOAA FISHERIES, IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT REPORT TO
CONGRESS 36, 38 (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/msra_page/





101. Id. Panama also noted three vessels accused of fishing while flagged to Panama
reflagged to Fiji or Vanuatu.
102. TANAKA, supra note 69, at 242 (discussing this practice and the practice of flag of
convenience States).
103. NOAA Fisheries, supra note 97, at 37-39.
104. This translates to the National Authority of Aquaculture and Fisheries.
105. NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 97, at 37-39; see also D. 4181/2011, Nov. 3, 2011,
Diario Oficial 48242-2011 [D.O.] (Colom.), available at http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sis-
jur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=44640; Funciones de la AUNAP, AUNAP, http://www.aunap
.gov.co/aunap/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
106. NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 97, at 36, 38.
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capacity allocated to Colombia,107 the IATTC registered these
vessels.108
The IATTC Convention mandates consideration of the overall
issue of fishing capacity within the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsi-
ble Fisheries.109 It follows that the new allocation to Colombia entails a
duty to ensure it has decision-making processes that are expeditious
and transparent as well as a duty to promote awareness of responsible
fisheries through education and training.110 However, the Comptrol-
ler’s Office of Colombia—the entity that monitors agencies to ensure
proper use of public resources—audited AUNAP and found many irreg-
ularities in their annual performance, particularly in the imposition of
fines and sanctions to IUU vessels, and in the performance of agree-
ments to promote marine research.111
In 2013, NMFS reported to Congress that these states engaged
in IUU fishing, but they were not issued a negative certification or sub-
jected to trade sanctions because they demonstrated correction of these
violations.112 The lack of transparency in implementing remedial ac-
tions makes it difficult to predict categorically whether vessels flagged
to these states or lower officials also corrected these IUU fishing viola-
tions. These IUU fish landed in Panama and Colombia and entered
these foreign markets possibly for export to the U.S.
II. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION-BASED INSTRUMENTS
International and regional cooperation between nations is nec-
essary to combat IUU fishing. There are three major cooperation-based
instruments that can be used by parties to FTAs to prevent IUU fisher-
ies from entering their markets: (1) Cooperative Environmental
Clauses of FTAs, (2) the FAO Guidelines for ecolabelling of wild fish,
and (3) the PSMA.
107. See generally id. at 37; see also LUIS ALBERTO ZULETA & ALEJANDRO BECERRA, EL
MERCADO DEL ATÚN EN COLOMBIA 57-58 (May 2013), available at http://www.reposi-
tory.fedesarrollo.org.co/handle/11445/205 (concluding that IATTC regulations, restrictions,
and allocations have had negative effects in the seafood industry and that the IATTC’s allo-
cation is limited).
108. See Vessel Search, IATTC, https://www.iattc.org/vesselregister/VesselList.aspx?
List=RegVessels&Lang=ENG#Colombia (last visited Aug. 30, 2015). Scroll down and select
Colombia. Once selected, a list of vessels will appear.
109. Plan for Regional Management of Fishing Capacity-73rd Meeting, INTER-AM. TROPI-
CAL TUNA COMM. (IATTC) (June 20, 2005), https://www.iattc.org/Meetings/Meetings2004-
2008ENG.htm.
110. FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries ART. 6 (1995) [hereinafter CCRF].
111. CONTRALORIA REPORT, supra note 93.
112. NOAA FISHERIES, supra note 97, at 38-39, 48-49.
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A. Cooperative Environmental Clauses of Three
Free Trade Agreements
FTAs open foreign markets to U.S. exporters by reducing barri-
ers and by creating a better trading environment.113 Yet, these
agreements undermine efforts to deter IUU fishing, because FTAs may
encourage the seafood industry to move and take advantage of relaxed
environmental regulations in developing nations that often lack the re-
sources to effectively enforce IUU fishing laws.114 Recognizing this
challenge and other environmental concerns, the drafters of FTAs have
included environmental clauses.
These agreements typically begin with a preamble that con-
firms that the parties “shall” implement the FTAs in a manner
consistent with environmental protection and conservation and that
promotes sustainable development and cooperation on environmental
matters.115 These are very important goals. Indeed, an entire chapter
is devoted to fulfill these objectives. The Dominican Republic-Central
America FTA (CAFTA-DR), for instance, was the first FTA between
the U.S. and a group of smaller developing economies, including Costa
Rica, that contained an entire chapter addressing environmental provi-
sions.116 The FTA between the U.S. and Colombia (U.S.-Colombia
FTA) and the FTA with Panama (U.S.-Panama FTA) each also have
chapters devoted to environmental provisions.117
As to the enforcement of environmental laws, these FTAs em-
phasize each nation “shall” ensure its laws provide for high levels of
113. Free Trade Agreements, supra note 61.
114. See generally C. O’Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agree-
ments: Why the NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 2, 75 (1994)
(addressing these issues regarding NAFTA).
115. See, e.g., Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colombia, May 15, 2012, 112 P.L. 42;
see also Free Trade Agreement, Dominican Republic-Central America-United States, Aug.
2, 2005, 109 P.L. 53; Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Panama, Oct. 31, 2012, 112 P.L. 43.
116. Dominican Republic-Central American-United States Free Trade Agreement Im-
plementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 (2005), available at https://ustr.gov/
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/
final-text [hereinafter CAFTA-DR]; see also Dominican Republic-Central America-United
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/%5C/FTA/cafta-
dr/index.asp (last updated July 1, 2015).
117. See United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-42, 125 Stat. 462 (2011), available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text [hereinafter U.S.-Colombia FTA]; United States-
Panama Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-43, 125 Stat.
497 (2011), available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/panama-
tpa/final-text [hereinafter U.S.-Panama FTA].
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environmental protection,118 and “shall” not fail to effectively enforce
environmental laws in a manner affecting trade.119 However, these
FTAs also provide that each party has the right to establish its own
levels of environmental protection.120 The greatest features of the
FTAs—the Environmental Cooperation Provisions, countervail the rec-
ognition that each party is a sovereign nation. These emphasize the
importance of cooperation to protect the environment and to promote
sustainable development,121 as well as acknowledge the importance of
environmental cooperation in other fora.122
These provisions predominantly reflect the parties’ agreement
to expand their cooperative relationship to protect the environment.123
To achieve this goal, the parties agreed to implement cooperative envi-
ronmental activities of the Environmental Cooperation Agreement
(ECA) while at the same time promoting regional economic integra-
tion.124 The ECA complements FTAs125 on issues where trade and
environment converge, and the Environmental Cooperation Commis-
sion (ECC) implements a work program that reflects the ECAs.126 In
other words, the cooperative environmental activities pursuant to the
ECA are to be coordinated by the ECC.127
118. U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 117, at art. 17.1; CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at art.
17.1; see also U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 117, at art. 18.1.
119. U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 117, at art. 17.3; CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at art.
17.2; U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 117, at art. 18.3.
120. U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 117, at art. 17.1; CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at art.
17.1; U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 117, at art. 18.1.
121. U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 117, at art. 17.10(1); CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at
art. 17.9(1); U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 117, at art. 18.10(1).
122. U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 117, at art. 17.10(5); CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at
art. 17.9(5); U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 117, at art. 18.10(3).
123. Compare U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 117, art. 17.10(2), and CAFTA-DR, supra
note 116, at art. 17.9(2) (establishing that the Parties recognize cooperation is important for
achieving their shared environmental goals, including the development and improvement of
environmental protection), with U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 112, at art. 18.10(2) (adding
the language: “including . . . environmental protection, practices, and technologies.”).
124. See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at annex 17.9(1); U.S.-Panama FTA, supra
note 117, at annex 17.10(1). See generally CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at preamble; U.S.-
Colombia FTA, supra note 117; U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 117.
125. See, e.g., EPA Efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean, ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (EPA), http://www2.epa.gov/international-cooperation/epa-efforts-latin-america-
and-caribbean (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
126. See, e.g., CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at art. 17.9(4); U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note
117, at art. 17.10(4) (noting that the U.S.-Panama FTA eliminates the language “and peri-
odically revising and updating” the work plan).
127. See, e.g., U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 117, at art 18.10(3).
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Several issues on environmental cooperation are addressed
more comprehensively in recent FTAs, particularly in their ECAs.128
Regarding regional cooperation, these recognize the importance of re-
gional cooperation for the protection and conservation of natural
resources.129 The ECAs then broaden the scope of application of the
cooperative clauses in FTAs,130 and authorize the ECC to define a work
program that may include regional objectives.131 For instance, an ECC
has already defined a work program for environmental cooperation—
the 2014-2017 U.S.-Colombia Work Program, which includes the re-
gional goals of cooperation to promote best practices to conserve
marine living resources, to address IUU fishing issues, and to enhance
communication with relevant regional and international
organizations.132
There are other collaborative activities that may be used to ap-
proach the problem of trade in IUU fisheries. These are the result of
some priorities for key environmental cooperation activities that the
parties to these three FTAs identified.133 First, the parties recognized
the need to strengthen each party’s environmental management sys-
tems (i.e. reinforcing institutional and legal frameworks, as well as
creating the capacity to implement and enforce environmental laws
and policies).134 Second, they recognized the importance of developing
128. See generally Taylor, supra note 114 (addressing the environmental effects of the
NAFTA).
129. Compare Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Panama
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, art. I (May 2, 2012), available at http://www
.state.gov/documents/organization/189455.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Panama ECA] (stating that
the “parties agree to cooperate to protect . . . natural resources . . . and recognize the impor-
tance of both bilateral and regional cooperation”), with Press Statement, Bureau of Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Colombia Environmental Co-
operation Agreement, art. 1 (Apr. 19, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/207971.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Colombia ECA] (stating the ECA’s objective “is to
establish a framework for strengthening bilateral and/or regional environmental coopera-
tion . . . aimed at enhancing environmental protection and the conservation and sustainable
use of natural resources . . .”).
130. EPA Efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean, supra note 125 (stating that
“[t]he U.S.-Colombia Environmental Cooperation Agreement (ECA) complements the U.S.-
Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement.”).
131. See, e.g., U.S.-Colombia ECA, supra note 129, at art. 1, art. 2, and art. 4(4).
132. EPA Efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean, supra note 125.
133. Despite some differences—particularly in the U.S.-Colombia FTA—the most im-
portant priorities for key environmental cooperation activities are established in Annex
17.9(3) of the CAFTA-DR (citing Article V of the ECA with Costa Rica), Annex 17.10(3) of
the U.S.-Panama FTA (citing Article IV of the ECA with Panama), and Articles II (a)-(f) and
IV (2)(a)-(k) of the U.S.-Colombia ECA of April 19, 2013.
134. Compare CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at annex 17.9(3)(a), and U.S.-Panama FTA,
supra note 117, at annex 17.10(3)(a) (“strengthening. . .environmental management sys-
tems, including . . . institutional and legal frameworks and the capacity to . . . enforce . . .
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and promoting incentives and other voluntary mechanisms to en-
courage environmental protection (i.e. through market-based and
economic incentives for environmental management),135 as well as
partnerships to address conservation and management issues.136 And
third, they recognized the need to promote best environmental prac-
tices that could lead to sustainable management137 and develop and
promote environmentally friendly goods.138 Finally, the CAFTA-DR
and the U.S.-Panama FTA also provide that conserving and managing
shared, migratory, and endangered species, as well as marine re-
sources in MPAs, is a priority.139
B. Key Measures of the FAO Port State Measures Agreement
and Duties to Cooperate
The increasing reliance on port states to combat IUU fishing140
began with the adoption of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the recognition of the importance of
port state measures (PSMs) as a fisheries management system.141
laws”), with U.S.-Colombia ECA, supra note 129, at art. IV(2)(a) (“strengthening . . . envi-
ronmental governance, management [and] capacity to . . . enforce . . . laws . . . .”).
135. Compare CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at annex 17.9(3)(b), and U.S.-Panama FTA,
supra note 117, at annex 17.10(3)(b) (“developing and promoting incentives and other . . .
voluntary mechanisms”), with U.S.-Colombia ECA, supra note 129, at art. IV(2)(d) (“devel-
oping and promoting . . . economic incentives . . . and voluntary mechanisms.”).
136. Compare CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at annex 17.9(3)(c), and U.S.-Panama FTA,
supra note 117, at annex 17.10(3)(c) (“fostering partnerships to address . . . conservation and
management issues”), with U.S.-Colombia ECA, supra note 129, at art. II(2)(d) (“facilitating
partnerships . . . to promote . . . best practices . . . .”).
137. Compare CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at annex 17.9(3)(f) (“promoting best practices
leading to sustainable management of the environment”), and U.S.-Panama FTA, supra
note 117, at annex 17.10(3)(f) (“promoting best practices of environmental management
leading to sustainable management”), with U.S.-Colombia ECA, supra note 129, at art.
IV(2)(b) (“strengthening the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources”), art.
(2)(c) (“promoting mechanisms to support the conservation and sustainable use”).
138. Compare CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, annex 17.9(3)(h), and U.S.-Panama FTA,
supra note 117, at annex 17.10(3)(h) (“developing and promoting environmentally beneficial
goods and services”), with U.S.-Colombia ECA, supra at note 129, art. IV(2)(g) (“promoting
the development . . . on environmental goods and services.”).
139. Compare CAFTA-DR, supra note 116, at annex 17.9(3)(d) (“conserving and manag-
ing shared, migratory, and endangered species in international trade and management” of
MPAs), with U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 117, at annex 17.10(3)(d) (“conserving and man-
aging species that are shared, migratory, endangered, or subject to international
commercial trade, as well as” MPAs).
140. A. Skonhoft, Port States Measures, FAO FISHERIES & AQUACULTURE DEP’T, http://
www.fao.org/fishery/psm/en (last updated Dec. 4, 2013).
141. DOULMAN & SWAN, supra note 28 (explaining that UNCLOS can be interpreted to
include provisions on PSMs).
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Since then, “increasing political pressures” have influenced nations to
agree to an UNCLOS regime that has gradually become binding hard
law.142 This is a regime of cooperation that involves port states, coastal
states, flag states, and regional and international organizations.143
Although coastal states have sovereign rights over natural re-
sources in their EEZs, they cannot disregard the duties set forth in
UNCLOS144 that include the duty to ensure living resources are not
endangered by over-exploitation.145 Foreign flagged-vessels fishing in
another state’s EEZ must also cooperate and comply with fishing re-
porting and landing requirements in addition to other CMMs.146
UNCLOS also calls for cooperation between neighbor nations, directly
or through an RFMO, to protect straddling and highly migratory fish
stocks.147 In other words, UNCLOS has numerous provisions relating
to a common duty to cooperate to “protect and preserve the marine en-
vironment” which also includes numerous obligations to cooperate to
prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing.148
Some of the objectives of the International Plan of Action to pre-
vent, deter, and eliminate IUU Fishing (IPOA-IUU) invoke the need
for PSMs to combat IUU fishing.149 The PSMA develops these mea-
sures and is built upon the cooperation between port states, as well as
the cooperation of port states with flag states, coastal states, and
RFMOs.150 It is also based on the premise that regional cooperation is
142. Harry N. Scheiber et al., Ocean Tuna Fisheries, East Asian Rivalries, and Interna-
tional Regulation: Japanese Policies and the Overcapacity/IUU Fishing Conundrum, 30 U.
HAW. L. REV. 97, 100-01 (2007).
143. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 745 (3d ed.
2007).
144. UNCLOS, supra note 73, at arts. 56(1)(a), 56(2).
145. Marion Markowski, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EEZ FISHERIES 26-6 (2010); see
also UNCLOS, supra note 73, at art. 61.
146. MARKOWSKI, supra note 145, at 26-6; see also UNCLOS, supra note 73, at art. 62(4).
147. UNCLOS, supra note 73, at arts. 63(1), 63(2); see also UNFSA, supra note 17, at
art. 8.
148. UNCLOS, supra note 73, at art. 19. See, e.g., CCRF, supra note 110, at art. 8.1
(noting the duties of all states include the supervision and control of fishing operations), art.
8.2 (listing flag state’s duties such as authorizing fishing operations and enforcing measures
against IUU fishing vessels), and art. 8.3 (noting the port states role in implementing these
measures). See IPOA-IUU, supra note 70, at 4-10 (listing states’, flag states’, coastal states’,
and port states’ responsibilities in implementing measures against IUU fishing); see also
Press Release, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Tribunal Delivers its Advisory
Opinion Regarding Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities (Apr. 2, 2015),
available at https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/
PR_227_EN.pdf (observing similar obligations in the case of fish stocks that occur both
within the EEZs members to the SRFC and its adjacent high seas).
149. Skonhoft, supra note 140.
150. DOULMAN & SWAN, supra note 28, at 35.
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necessary to ensure harmonization in the scope, structure, application,
and sanctions of domestic port measures to combat IUU fishing.151 To
this end, effective regional mechanisms oriented to strengthen cooper-
ation must be established, including closing all ports to IUU fishing
vessels.152
The denial of use of ports is a key measure under the PSMA.
Port uses such as “landing, transshipping, packaging and processing of
fish that have not been previously landed and other port services in-
cluding, inter alia, refueling and re-supplying, maintenance and dry
docking” would always be denied to IUU fishing vessels.153 These uses
may be denied prior to entry into port (i.e. when a vessel is on IUU
vessel lists of an RFMO), upon entry into port (i.e. when a foreign ves-
sel is fishing without authorization from the flag or coastal state, or
cannot confirm whether the catch complied with domestic and RFMOs’
fishing requirements), or after an inspection (i.e. when a vessel has
engaged in IUU fishing or fishing related activities).154
The most interesting feature of the PSMA is the use of coopera-
tion provisions to impose obligations upon flag state parties and non-
parties. The PSMA’s Preamble calls for cooperation between flag states
and port states.155 Parties must undertake actions relating to ports
and to the supervision and control of their fishing vessels.156 In their
capacity as flag states, they must cooperate with port inspections, re-
quest other port states to inspect vessels flying its flag if they were
engaged in IUU fishing, encourage their vessels to use ports that com-
ply with the PSMA, initiate immediate investigation and proceedings
against IUU fishing vessels flying its flag identified by any port state,
report actions taken against IUU fishing vessels, and take other ac-
tions to combat IUU fishing.157 They are also required to encourage
non-parties to become parties to the PSMA, and must deter activities
of non-parties that undermine the effective implementation of the
151. Id. at 5.
152. Id.
153. Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unre-
ported and Unregulated Fishing art. 9(6), FAO Conference (Nov. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/037t-e.pdf [hereinafter PSMA].
154. DOULMAN & SWAN, supra note 28, at 34 (citing Agreement on Port State Measures
to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported And Unregulated Fishing at arts. 9(4)-
(5), 11, and 18).
155. Id.
156. Port State Measures Agreement, supra note 29.
157. Id.; see also PSMA, supra note 153, at art. 20.6.
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Agreement.158 To this end, the PSMA encourages public identification
of states that contravene the Agreement.159
Another innovative requirement is the sharing of information
at the international level, particularly IUU vessel lists.160 The PSMA
aims to combat IUU fishing through cooperation between states and
RFMOs, and by effective communication and coordinated action
amongst flag states, coastal states, and relevant RFMOs and interna-
tional organizations.161 The PSMA establishes numerous mechanisms
and requirements related to procedures for notification, communica-
tion, and release of information.162 It also provides assistance for
developing nations to develop the legal mechanisms and technical ca-
pacity necessary to implement PSMs against IUU Fishing.163
C. Voluntariness of Ecolabelling Programs and Cooperation
Obligations of Flag States
Another important aspect of UNCLOS is the reassurance that
every nation has the right for its nationals to engage in fishing on the
high seas.164 This right is subject to treaties to which the flag state is a
party, the UNCLOS rights and interests of coastal states, and the UN-
CLOS provisions on the high seas.165 These provisions include the flag
state’s duty to adopt measures for the conservation of living resources
in the high seas, to cooperate with other states and RFMOs in the con-
servation and management of shared and highly migratory fish stocks,
and to adopt conservation measures for those nationals fishing on the
high seas.166 In addition, flag states must keep their vessels under sur-
158. DOULMAN & SWAN, supra note 28, at 36.
159. Id. at 62 (noting the PSMA encourages identification of states that may not be
acting in a manner consistent with it, and encourages the development of procedures for
identifying such states through RFMOs and the FAO).




164. UNCLOS, supra note 73, at art. 87(e).
165. Id. at 116(a)-(c).
166. See id. at arts. 117, 118, 119; see also Southern Bluefin Tuna (Australia v. Japan;
New Zealand v. Japan), Case No. 3 & 4, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, ITLOS Rep., available at
https://www.itlos.org/en/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-3-4/ (ordering States to ensure catches do
not exceed the annual national allocations at the levels last agreed by the parties, and to
make further efforts to reach agreement with other States and fishing entities to ensure
optimum utilization of the stock).
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veillance and control, and take measures to prevent vessels from IUU
fishing in the high seas and in the EEZs of other states.167
Of particular relevance for voluntary ecolabel programs is the
fact that flag states assume jurisdiction over each vessel and its
crew168 because “the ship, everything on it, and every person involved
or interested in its operations” are considered as a unit linked to the
flag state.169 Once a vessel meets the flag state’s conditions for the
grant of its nationality, it is entitled to receive flag documents.170 The
vessel itself, its activities, and its crew must comply with the flag
state’s domestic laws because the registration is treated like a grant of
citizenship.171 Each vessel and its crew should then comply with
CMMs while exercising the right to fish; however, this is one of the flag
states’ greatest challenges in policing, particularly for developing
nations.172
To deal with this challenge, the international community has
encouraged the involvement of all nations in ecolabelling schemes be-
cause they are designed to certify and promote labels for products from
well-managed marine capture fisheries and to assure sustainable use
of fisheries resources, as well as to incentivize a reduction of environ-
mental impacts.173 In other words, ecolabelling schemes entitle a
fishery product to bear a distinctive logo that certifies the fish were
harvested in compliance with conservation and sustainability
standards.174
The MSC was found to be the most compliant with the Guide-
lines for the Ecolabelling of Fish and Fishery Products from Marine
Capture Fisheries (FAO Guidelines).175 The FAO Guidelines aim to
promote ecolabelling schemes that verify a specific fishery operates in
167. See UNCLOS, supra note 73, at art. 94(1); see also TED MCDORMAN ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL OCEAN LAW 289 (2005) (addressing and citing to the UNFSA).
168. See UNCLOS, supra note 73, at art. 94(2)(b); see also S.S “Lotus,” 1927 P.C.I.J (ser.
A) No. 10 at 26 (Sept. 7) (stating there is no doubt ships on the high seas are subject to the
jurisdiction of the State whose flag they fly).
169. M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Order of July 1, 1999,
ITLOS Rep. at 106.
170. UNCLOS, supra note 73, at art. 91(1); see also M/V “SAIGA,” supra note 169, at 63
(stating that under art. 91, it is for the flag states “to fix the conditions for the grant of its
nationality to ships” under domestic law, and “to issue . . . flag documents to that effect”).
171. MCDORMAN ET AL., supra note 167, at 147-48.
172. See TANAKA, supra note 69, at 152; see also MCDORMAN ET AL., supra note 167 (stat-
ing that flag states can take measures to ensure their vessels’ compliance with CMMs while
they exercise the right to fish).
173. FAO GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at 2, 108; see also GEE, supra note 55, at 1-4.
174. FAO GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at 5.
175. GEE, supra note 55, at 2.
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compliance with domestic and international regulations, and has no
adverse impacts on the ecosystem.176 MSC therefore is guided by a
principle that a fishery must be conducted in a manner that avoids
depletion of exploited fisheries, or in a manner that increases popula-
tions already depleted.177 It also promotes compliance with domestic
and international marine conservation standards and incorporates
frameworks for responsible and sustainable use of fisheries.178 Fishing
operations, on the other hand, must allow for the maintenance of the
ecosystem on which the fishery depends.179
Although the MSC ecolabelling program and other similar pro-
grams are voluntary and market-driven, the FAO Guidelines and the
normative basis for all sustainable fisheries standards are based on
international fisheries instruments such as UNCLOS, the 1995 UN
Fish Stocks Agreement, and the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries, as well as all applicable national legislation.180 The mini-
mum substantive requirements and the criteria for assessing whether
a fishery can be certified for an ecolabel to be awarded to a fishery are
also based on these instruments.181 While some states may be bound
by these international instruments, they are not bound by the FAO
guidelines and ecolabelling programs.
III. PROPOSALS TO PREVENT AND DETER TRADE IN IUU FISHERIES
A. Free Trade Agreements Can Help Prevent IUU Fisheries
from Entering the Market
1. Enforcing Cooperative Environmental Clauses to Enhance
Foreign Port Controls
Greater attention should be given to port controls abroad, be-
cause the lack of adequate port controls in seafood-exporting nations
increases the probability of IUU fisheries entering the U.S. market.182
The PSMA is used as an important tool to combat, prevent, deter, and
176. FAO GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at 6-7, 10.
177. GEE, supra note 55, at 7.
178. FAO GUIDELINES, supra note 54, at 6-7.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1, 13-14 (addressing the sustainable fisheries standards that comprise quan-
titative and qualitative indicators of the governance or management systems of a fishery, as
well as of its outcome in terms of conservation).
181. Id. at 5.
182. See generally Skonhoft, supra note 140 (stating that there is an urgent need to
enhance port state controls and port measures to combat IUU fishing); see also Pramod et
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eliminate IUU fishing because it allows port states to enforce CMMs
against IUU fishing, blocks the entrance of IUU catches into their mar-
ket, makes operation of IUU fishing vessels rather difficult, and
enhances cooperation between nations to identify IUU vessels.183
Had the U.S. led other nations along the East Pacific Ocean in
harmonizing the scope, structure, application, and sanctions of their
PSMs to combat IUU fishing, the vessels flagged to Panama, Costa
Rica, and Colombia that caught the IUU fish that were possibly ex-
ported to the U.S. would have been denied the use of ports. These
vessels would have been forced to travel longer distances to find a port
that would have allowed them to land their catch, thereby increasing
its operational cost and decreasing the value of their IUU catch. The
denial of ports for landing, transshipping, and processing of fish, as
well as for refueling and re-supplying, maintenance, and dry-docking,
is a fundamental purpose of the PSMA.184
The PSMA encourages port states to deny use of ports to all
IUU vessels so that the vessels on IUU vessel lists of RFMOs (such as
the ones flagged to Colombia and Panama) would have been denied the
use of ports. This denial of port access would also apply to foreign ves-
sels, such as the ones flagged to Ecuador and other neighboring states
that engaged in IUU fishing in jurisdictional waters of Colombia and
Costa Rica (or the vessels that fished without being on the IATTC reg-
istry or that contravened this RFMO’s fishing regulations). Had these
vessels been denied the use of ports, their catch would not have en-
tered the foreign markets to be exported.
The PSMA also imposes obligations on flag states’ parties and
non-parties. Had these three nations been parties to the PSMA, they
would have cooperated with port inspections and requested other port
states to inspect the vessels that were suspected of having engaged in
IUU fishing. The countries would have also encouraged all their ves-
sels to use ports that comply with the PSMA, and would have initiated
proceedings against IUU fishing vessels. In the case of vessels that
IUU fished in jurisdictional waters of Colombia and Costa Rica and in
the IATTC area, these states could have reported actions taken against
these vessels to make this information public.
al., supra note 4 (explaining where and how IUU fisheries enter the U.S. market and esti-
mating the amount of IUU fish entering the U.S. seafood market).
183. Mozambique Takes a Strong Stand on Illegal Fishing, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/smart_fishing/resources_and_
publications/?229033/Mozambique-takes-a-strong-stand-on-illegal-fishing.
184. See supra Part II.B.
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Even if these states do not wish to become a party to the PSMA,
they can implement similar PSMs as the ones in the PSMA. The U.S.
must use all mechanisms available to compel them to implement such
measures. First, it can use tariffs to compel state parties to FTAs to
strengthen their port controls, as having preferential tariffs on numer-
ous goods and services also benefits other sectors of the economy.
Second, the cooperative environmental clauses of FTAs can be enforced
to improve port controls. ECAs under FTAs already recognize the im-
portance of regional cooperation for the protection of natural resources,
so the ECC can define a work program that may include regional objec-
tives, such as harmonization in the scope, structure, and sanctions of
their port measures to combat IUU fishing.
The ECC’s work program may include a broad range of activi-
ties, as the parties to these three FTAs have already recognized
numerous priorities for key environmental cooperation activities. They
agreed to take actions to strengthen their environmental management
systems that may include PSMs against IUU fishing. They also agreed
to promote best environmental practices leading to sustainable man-
agement, such as implementing PSMs. In order to force IUU vessels to
travel longer distances and reduce the profitability of IUU fishing, the
ECC’s work program may include activities that require Costa Rica,
Panama, and Colombia to deny the use of ports to all IUU fishing. Be-
cause IUU vessels will be forced to travel longer distances, they may
choose to make sustainable use of the resources so they are allowed to
land their catch.
2. Conditioning Preferential Tariffs to Encourage
Voluntary Seafood Ecolabels
FTAs also increase the profits of the seafood industry—and any
government action that increases seafood industry profits is tanta-
mount to a fisheries subsidy.185 This subsidy is being granted to
imports of fresh or chilled fish, frozen fish, fish fillets and other fish
meat, dried fish, crustaceans, mollusks, and aquatic invertebrates that
enter the U.S. market in shipments of seafood of “mixed origin,” includ-
ing IUU fisheries.186 Unless a system to monitor fishing activities is
185. LENA WESTLUND, FAO CONSULTANT, GUIDE FOR IDENTIFYING, ASSESSING AND RE-
PORTING ON SUBSIDIES IN THE FISHERIES SECTOR 7 (2004), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/doc
rep/fao/007/y5424e/y5424e00.pdf.
186. These seafood products enjoy zero tariffs. For specific information relating to tariffs
of all seafood imports see EXPORTS.GOV, http://export.gov/fta/ftatarifftool/TariffSearch.aspx
(last visited Aug. 30, 2015) (user simply needs to indicate whether he or she is importing or
exporting goods, select the partner country, and search for the product).
\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\10-2\FAM203.txt unknown Seq: 26 22-APR-16 13:16
374 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 10:2:349
implemented, the U.S. is prevented from verifying whether a shipment
contains IUU catches and, as a result, duty free IUU fish will continue
to enter the U.S market.
The parties to these three FTAs also have recognized the impor-
tance of developing and promoting incentives and other voluntary
mechanisms to encourage environmental protection that include mar-
ket-based and economic incentives for environmental management,
such as zero tariffs for market participants that certify their seafood.
Thus, the U.S. may use tariffs to encourage voluntary certifications.
These certifications are a very important tool when it comes to verify-
ing that a fishery complies with CMMs, as well as to corroborate that a
shipment of seafood does not contain IUU fish.
To certify a fishery, an FAO Guideline compliant program (such
as the MSC) assesses the management systems, the fishery and associ-
ated stock, and the serious impacts of the fishery on the ecosystem.187
The presence of these programs also fosters development and support
of fisheries to become increasingly sustainable.188 These programs re-
duce the environmental impacts resulting from fishing activities, and
benefit all market participants. Fishers-producers get easy access to
markets, recognition, price premiums, and increased negotiating
power for access to the resources; retailers and suppliers receive value
for the brand, price premiums, and reassurance of future supplies.
Consumers are reassured that the seafood has reduced ecological im-
pacts.189 Unfortunately, although the benefits of these programs are
apparent, cost remains the key factor in implementing them.
Costs depend on the industry’s structure, but may be countered
with the price premiums that a consumer would pay for certified sea-
food products.190 These stimuli are important, yet insufficient, to
compel the seafood industry to certify their seafood. Tariffs, on the
other hand, are more compelling when deciding whether to certify sea-
food. Tariffs are a very important aspect of import-export businesses
and constitute a crucial cost factor when importing and exporting sea-
food. The seafood industry should not receive preferential treatment
when importing seafood to the U.S. whenever it does not certify its sea-
food. The U.S. is in the bargaining position to condition preferential
tariffs to coerce the industry to certify seafood through the MSC or an-
other program in accordance with FAO Guidelines.
187. See supra Part II.C.
188. GEE, supra note 55, at 1, 9.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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An ecolabel or certificate will have to accompany seafood im-
ports from any state party to an FTA, so the U.S. can verify the initial
producer’s compliance with CMMs. Tariffs will only be eliminated upon
showing of such ecolabel or certificate. The seafood industry will have
to examine the price premiums and other benefits in certifying as well
as the savings of having preferential tariffs, and then subtract the
costs relating to a certification program.191 Accordingly, it can decide
whether to implement a new certification and ecolabelling program, or
assume the increased costs associated with not receiving zero or re-
duced tariffs.
A simple cost-benefit analysis of the economic incentives of
FTAs compared to the costs of certifying seafood will permit the U.S. to
ensure preferential tariffs do not constitute yet another incentive to
trade in IUU fisheries.192 Conditioning preferential tariffs is an effec-
tive way to use the current trade legal framework to ensure increased
seafood imports reach U.S. consumers at lower prices but not at the
expense of U.S. fishermen who have to comply with stringent U.S. fish-
ing regulations. The U.S. must ensure that U.S. trade policies and
fishing regulations are in order, but do not provide an unlawful price
advantage to foreigners.
B. Bolstering the Lacey Act to Deter Trade in IUU Fisheries
As previously discussed, one of the most significant challenges
in preventing IUU fish from entering the U.S. market is that most co-
operation-based instruments are not binding unless the exporting-
nation agrees to be bound. No matter what steps the U.S. takes to re-
duce IUU fishing activities and the trade in IUU fish in its territory
and jurisdictional waters, the challenge of eliminating IUU fishing
goes beyond its boundaries. Even if the U.S. intends to provide extra-
territorial application to its domestic wildlife conservation laws193 such
as the Lacey Act, it is unclear whether such laws would apply to all
foreign-flagged vessels and their crews when they violate CMMs of
191. The economic and financial considerations of this analysis are beyond the scope of
this paper. For a definition of cost benefit analysis, see Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), Bus.
Dictionary, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/cost-benefit-analysis-CBA.html#i
xzz3WdkAWRvr (last visited Aug. 30, 2015).
192. Although this paper relates to the use of tariffs in FTAs, the solution proposed in
this paper would also be applicable to other nations that are non-parties to FTAs that im-
port seafood into the U.S. and receive preferential tariffs under the original GATT,
succeeded by the Agreements Establishing the Word Trade Organization.
193. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 143, at 1510-30 (discussing the extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. environmental statutes).
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RFMO/As, or to U.S. nationals who trade in fisheries caught by vessels
in IUU lists of RFMOs.
1. The Act’s Element of Violation to Foreign Laws
and U.S. Treaties
The Act provides for certain civil and criminal penalties194 to
deter unlawful trade in fisheries.195 Under section 3372(a)(1) of the
Act, it is unlawful “to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire,
or purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken, possessed, transported,
or sold in violation of any law, treaty, or regulation of the [U.S.]
. . . .”196 Section 3372(a)(2)(A), on the other hand, makes it unlawful “to
import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in inter-
state or foreign commerce any fish or wildlife taken, possessed,
transported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State or
in violation of any foreign law.”197 Two types of laws are particularly
important to apply the Act to conduct overseas: foreign laws and U.S.
treaties.
Regarding foreign laws, Congress has the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations198 and does not unconstitutionally dele-
gate legislative power to foreign governments by incorporating foreign
laws into the Act,199 because these laws are not assimilated into fed-
eral laws.200 The U.S. government does not apply the foreign law, but
rather looks to it to determine if the Act’s provisions are triggered.201
Because these laws cover numerous regimes around the world, defend-
ants often raise challenges on vagueness grounds. These challenges
generally are unsuccessful because the language that imposes civil
sanctions is reviewed for vagueness with a high degree of flexibility,
and the language that imposes criminal penalties is reasonably certain
to survive “an attack for failure to provide sufficient notice.”202
194. U.S. v. Lee, 937 F.2d 1388, 1390-91 (9th Cir. 1991).
195. BLOCH MCMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH, CASES, STATUTES,
AND PROBLEMS 31 (2005) (defining deterrence as a notion of reducing crime through the fear
of punishment).
196. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(1) (2015).
197. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A).
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
199. Rioseco, 845 F.2d at 301-02.
200. U.S. v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 1989).
201. Id.
202. The Act has survived vagueness challenges despite the fact that it provides for both
civil and criminal penalties because the standard of review for each is different. The lan-
guage providing for civil sanctions “is reviewed for vagueness with somewhat ‘greater
tolerance’ than one involving criminal penalties.” To impose criminal sanctions, the Act re-
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An issue often raised is the vagueness of the phrase “any for-
eign law.” The Act’s definition of the word “law” begins with the word
“laws,” and does not establish whether the word “laws” is restricted to
foreign statutes or whether it includes other legally binding foreign
regulations and rules.203 To determine its plain meaning, courts have
turned to dictionary definitions and cited broad and narrow defini-
tions.204 Law means any rule of conduct that has binding legal force,
but also simply means a statute.205 Courts, therefore, have held the
term law is ambiguous and have looked beyond the language to deter-
mine legislative intent.206
The Act is a federal law that was introduced in 1900 to protect
wildlife and proscribe interstate illegal trafficking in wildlife,207 and
was amended in 1981 due to the increased illegal trade in fisheries and
wildlife.208 The intent of Congress in amending the Act “was to expand
its scope and enhance its deterrent effect.”209 It intended for foreign
laws to include regulations, non-statutory provisions such as resolu-
tions, and other legally binding provisions that foreign governments
may promulgate to protect wildlife,210 such as decrees.211 It also in-
cludes foreign laws that only impose civil fines,212 and economic
regulations relating to wildlife.213 Certainly, the underlying law must
be valid during the time period charged in the indictment.214 Courts
often look to the forum where the law was promulgated to determine
quires a showing of knowledge, which mitigates its potential vagueness. See id. at 829; see
also Lee, 937 F.2d at 1394-95.
203. U.S. v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2003), as amended (May 29,
2003).




208. See id.; see also 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d at 827.
209. McNab, 331 F.3d at 1238 (quoting 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d at 828).
210. See Lee, 937 F.2d at 1395-96 (holding that the term “any foreign law” encompasses
a foreign regulation); see also 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d at 830 (holding that a
Taiwanese regulation is a “foreign law” under the Act).
211. U.S. v. 2,507 Live Canary Winged Parakeets (Brotogeris Versicolorus), 689 F.
Supp. 1106, 1114 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that a shipment that contravened a Peruvian
decree was a violation of the Lacey Act).
212. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d at 828-29 (holding that a law imposing civil
sanctions triggers the Act).
213. Lee, 937 F.2d at 1392 (holding that a salmon regulation intended as an economic
measure falls under the Act).
214. See generally U.S. v. Reeves, 891 F. Supp. 2d 690, 697 (D.N.J. 2012) (rejecting the
argument that an invalid state regulation not passed in accordance with state laws could
serve as the Act’s predicate).
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its validity and effect,215 and rely on experts of foreign law to deter-
mine the validity of the offenses under foreign law.216 Therefore, the
government has the burden of establishing the validity of the underly-
ing law.217
In addition to foreign laws, U.S. treaties also may trigger the
Act. The Constitution grants the President the power to make trea-
ties218 with foreign nations that the President negotiates and the
Senate ratifies to be effective.219 Even if an agreement is not submitted
to the Senate for approval, it is effective so long as the President
signs.220 These are known as Executive Agreements, and can be used
for any purpose.221 Both Treaties and Executive Agreements are bind-
ing under international law222 and upon the parties223 that have
consented to be bound.224 In this context, a violation by a party to a
U.S. Treaty or Executive Agreement is sufficient to apply the Act, as
well as a violation of U.S. regulations adopted under a treaty, such as
regulations on catch limits.225 With regard to non-parties, the U.S.
may give extraterritorial application to domestic laws,226 but it is un-
clear whether an executive agreement relating to CMMs may also
apply overseas. The general rule is that U.S. laws are presumed not to
215. See id. at 707 (holding that the term “law or regulation of any state” in 16 U.S.C.
§ 3372(a)(2)(A) requires reference to the state law to determine if a given requirement quali-
fies as a law or regulation under state law); see also U.S. v. Molt, 599 F.2d 1217, 1218-19 (3d
Cir. 1979) (holding that foreign laws and regulations referred to in the Act are laws and
regulations for the protection of wildlife in Fiji and Papua New Guinea).
216. See, e.g., Molt, 599 F.2d at 1220 (stating the lower court overlooked the testimony
of an expert witness); see also 2,507 Live Canary Winged Parakeets, 689 F. Supp. at 1113-14
(relying on experts’ testimony).
217. See generally United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816, 824 (9th Cir. 1985).
218. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
219. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 368 (3d ed.
2006).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 668.
222. How to . . . Research Treaties, U.S SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/com-
mon/faq/Treaties.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2015) (addressing the differences between
treaties and executive agreements).
223. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
339.
224. See id. at art 2(g), at 333 (defining the term “party”).
225. See, e.g., United States v. Cameron, 888 F.2d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that violations to catch limits adopted by the International Pacific Halibut Commission
(IPHC) were sufficient for the Act to be applied, as well as regulations promulgated by the
IPHC, which are deemed to be adopted in accordance to 16 U.S.C. §§ 773-773k).
226. See generally HUNTER ET AL., supra note 143, at 1509 (addressing extraterritorial
application of U.S laws); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) for a definition of
extraterritorial.
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have extraterritorial effect,227 but the application of U.S. laws overseas
“has become increasingly common.”228
As a preliminary consideration, courts have applied the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality in a manner inconsistent with
prior precedents relating to the use of federal statutes to regulate con-
duct outside the U.S. boundaries.229 In the early 1990s, for instance,
the Supreme Court adopted a test of strict presumption against extra-
territoriality.230 In this regard, it appears the Court has moved away
from a strict presumption test to numerous alternative tests, but this
variation has added “to the incoherence of the Court’s
jurisprudence.”231
So far, the courts have consistently reaffirmed that there is a
“longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.”232 Despite other interpretations to
restrict the scope of the presumption against extraterritoriality, courts
have held that only Congress may overcome this presumption and pro-
scribe or regulate conduct outside of the boundaries of the U.S.233
Courts must then determine whether Congress clearly manifested and
intended to proscribe or regulate conduct beyond the U.S. territory be-
cause “whether Congress has actually exercised that authority is a
matter of statutory interpretation.”234 Although courts will take differ-
ent approaches to the presumption against extraterritoriality, courts
227. See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 764 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2014) (recog-
nizing a presumption against extraterritoriality); see also Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank
Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-78 (2010) (holding that “when a statute gives no clear indication
of an extraterritorial application, it has none”).
228. Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93
MINN. L. REV. 815, 844 (2009).
229. See John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L
L. 351, 396 (2010) (noting that “since the early 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence with respect to the reach of federal statutes has become incoherent and inconsistent
with the Court’s earlier decisions”); see generally Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in
the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Environmental Statutes: A Proposal for an Inte-
grated Judicial Standard Based on the Continuum of Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 91
(2006).
230. See Knox, supra note 229, at 375-76 (citing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244 (1991), and stating that in “the early 1990s, the Court dramatically strengthened
the presumption against extraterritoriality”); see also E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991) [hereinafter Aramco] (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281
(1949)).
231. See Knox, supra note 229, at 377.
232. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248; see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877; Smith v. United
States, 507 U.S. 197, 203-04, (1993); European Cmty., 764 F.3d at 133.
233. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285; see also European Cmty., 764 F.3d at 133.
234. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 143, at 1513.
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will more commonly allow extraterritorial application of economic laws
than environmental laws.235
2. Amending the Act to Include Conservation and Management
Measures of Regional Fisheries Management
Organization/Arrangements
The Lacey Act has far-reaching criminal and civil effects on
IUU fishing activities abroad and the trade of IUU fisheries caught
beyond the U.S. jurisdictional waters, and may deter the trade in IUU
fisheries. However, it must be amended to provide a revised and more
comprehensive scheme, because the current provisions relating to the
extraterritorial application of the Act are inadequate.
There is uncertainty as to whether CMMs of a RFMO such as
the IATTC’s CMMs may qualify as “foreign laws” under the Act.236 To
illustrate, three instruments are important for these CMMs to have
binding effect: the Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-Amer-
ican Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC Convention), the Protocol to
Amend the 1949 Convention (The Protocol), and the Convention for the
Strengthening of the 1949 Convention (Antigua Convention).237 Costa
Rica ratified the IATTC Convention,238 so it has the force of a Treaty
for this State. Panama ratified The Protocol, but Colombia did not even
sign it.239 It is, therefore, a treaty for Panama, but has no binding ef-
fect for Colombia.240 Panama and Costa Rica also ratified the Antigua
Convention,241 but Colombia has not even signed it.242 Therefore, it
235. Id. at 1514.
236. This proposal will not address the extraterritorial application of § 3372(a)(1) since
all instruments mentioned in this paper may be applied extraterritorially so long as they
are ratified by the U.S. But the process of ratification is often long and courts are reluctant
to give extraterritorial application of U.S environmental laws, so deterring IUU fishing ac-
tivities and the trade in IUU fisheries through § 3372(a)(1) is as of yet more uncertain.
237. See generally CARRIE S. SOLTANOFF, NOAA OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, IN-
TERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONCERNING LIVING MARINE RESOURCES OF INTEREST TO NOAA
FISHERIES 42 (2013), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/resources/2013_int_agr_book
.pdf.
238. Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commis-
sion, U.S.-Costa Rica, Mar. 3, 1950, 1 U.S.T. 230 [hereinafter IATTC Convention].
239. Protocol to Amend the 1949 Convention tn the Establishment of an Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission, IATTC, https://www.iattc.org/conventionprotocoleng.htm (last
updated July 24, 2012).
240. For a treaty to be valid in Colombia, its Congress must approve it. The President
may only give provisional application to treaties relating economic and commercial nature
that must always be sent to Congress for approval, otherwise, the effect and application of
such treaty will be suspended. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P] art. 224.
241. Antigua Convention, IATCC, https://www.iattc.org/IATTCdocumentationENG.htm
(last updated Feb. 10, 2014).
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has binding effect as a treaty for Costa Rica and Panama, but has no
binding effect on Colombia.
In cases of violations of CMMs of this RFMO, courts will have to
decide whether the IATTC Convention, The Protocol, and the Antigua
Convention are valid foreign laws of Costa Rica, Panama, and Colom-
bia, sufficient to trigger the Act and whether the CMMs adopted by the
IATTC, an RFMO that was established by these instruments, are also
valid foreign laws. Given the very broad judicial interpretation of the
Act’s three-word phrase “any foreign laws,”243 it is safe to conclude a
court will likely find these instruments are foreign laws as long as an
expert determines they are valid.244 In the cases of Costa Rica and
Panama, an expert will likely find the instruments ratified by the
States valid, but Colombia has not signed or ratified any of them.
Thus, these instruments are not valid laws in Colombia.245
The case law relating to the validity of these instruments under
section 3372(a)(2)(A) is limited to nonexistent. Courts will have to de-
termine whether fishing or trade activities that contravene CMMs of
this RFMO, established by an instrument to which a State has not
agreed to be bound, will trigger section 3372(a)(2)(A). To deal with this
challenge, courts will likely rely on the opinion of an expert on foreign
law who will determine whether the CMMs that gave rise to the under-
lying court proceedings are valid laws in that particular State, so that
the trier of fact may decide whether or not it was unlawful  “to import,
export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or for-
eign commerce any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or
sold . . . in violation of any foreign law.”246
The risk if the Act is not amended is a deluge of judicial opin-
ions with different conclusions concerning the validity of the same
instrument. For instance, consider the IUU fishing vessels flagged to
Panama and Colombia that violated the IATTC’s CMMs detailed in
this paper. An expert in foreign law will probably establish that the
CMMs of the IATTC, or to be more precise, the CMMs implementing
The Protocol and the Antigua Convention, are valid laws in Panama
because Panama has signed and ratified these instruments, but Co-
242. Id.
243. For further discussion on this broad interpretation, see supra Part III.B.1.
244. For further discussion about the validity of “foreign laws” see id.
245. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P] art. 224 (mandating that for a treaty to
be valid, it must be approved by Congress, and establishing that the President may only
give provisional application to treaties relating economic and commercial nature that must
always be sent to Congress for approval, otherwise, the effect and application of such Treaty
will be suspended).
246. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A).
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lombia has neither signed nor ratified them. Therefore, an expert will
probably establish that the same CMMs are not valid laws for Colom-
bia. As a result, a court will likely apply the Act to proscribe IUU
fishing activities conducted by Panamanian nationals, but not against
Colombian nationals. At the same time, U.S. nationals who have
traded in these IUU fisheries may be punished only if they imported,
exported, transported, sold, received, acquired, or purchased fisheries
caught by IUU fishing vessels flagged to Panama, and not if the vessels
were flagged to Colombia.
In addition to issues concerning the enforcement of CMMs of
RFMOs, courts will have to deal with issues related to CMMs of
RFMAs. Instruments that stipulate the parties’ express intent not to
be bound often create RFMAs. These instruments may take the form of
Arrangements,247 Memorandums of Understanding,248 or even Decla-
rations, so long as they relate to a “cooperative mechanism established
in accordance with [UNCLOS] and [UNFSA] by two or more States” to
establish CMMs in a sub-region or region.249 Indeed, the term “Decla-
ration” is “deliberately chosen to indicate that the parties do not intend
to create binding obligations but merely want to declare certain aspira-
tions.”250 Although the San Jose Declaration251 states that “the parties
agreed” to create a joint management system for the sustainable use of
marine resources in the ETPS,252 it uses the term “Declaration” so a
court will likely find that it is not legally binding because it simply
declares the aspirations of the CMAR States. And, unlike the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the San Jose Declaration does not
reflect customary international law.
It is highly unlikely that CMMs of RFMAs will qualify as for-
eign laws unless they have been adopted by national legislation. Since
247. See, e.g., International Fisheries, MINISTRY FOR PRIMARY INDUSTRIES, http://www
.fish.govt.nz/en-nz/Publications/Ministerial+Briefings/Ministerial+Briefing+05/Annex+1+-
+Fisheries+Management+in+New+Zealand/Internationalı̂sheries.htm (last visited Aug. 30,
2015).
248. See, e.g., Introduction, INDIAN OCEAN -  SOUTH-EAST ASIAN MARINE TURTLE MEMO-
RANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, http://www.ioseaturtles.org/introduction.php (last visited Aug.
30, 2015).
249. UNFSA, supra note 17, at art. 1(d).
250. Definition of Key Terms Used in the UN Treaty Collection, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/
page1_en.xml (last visited Aug. 30, 2015) (stating that few declarations not originally in-
tended to be binding, but reflecting customary international law such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, may be considered binding).
251. This paper does not advocate that the CMAR is a Regional Fisheries Management
Arrangement because the CMAR does not focus on specific marine species and it appears
that the CMAR does not have managerial functions.
252. Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape Project, supra note 13.
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sovereign States are reluctant to enter into agreements that curtail
their right to exploit marine resources within their jurisdictional wa-
ters or their right to fish on the high seas, the U.S. will continue to be
prevented from deterring IUU fishing activities overseas. Subse-
quently, these IUU fisheries will continue to enter foreign markets,
including the markets of parties to the U.S. FTAs, possibly to be ex-
ported to the U.S.
These challenges impose a high burden on the court system,
and increase the time and costs involved in judicial proceedings. A
court will need to determine on a case-by-case basis whether these
sources of law are sufficient to trigger the Act, which may lead to con-
flicting results. Congress can alleviate this burden by amending
section 3372(a)(2)(A). The following amendment is being proposed to
clarify that CMMs of RFMO/As will also trigger the Act: “(a) Offenses
other than marking offenses: It is unlawful for any person . . . (2) to
import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in inter-
state or foreign commerce (A) any fish or wildlife taken, possessed,
transported, or sold . . . in violation of any foreign law or conservation
and management253 measures of Regional Fisheries Management Or-
ganizations254 or Arrangements.”255
3. Leveraging the Act’s Automatic Application:
IUU lists of RMFOs and the NMFS
The purpose of the proposed amendment to section
3372(a)(2)(A) is to clarify that other laws, such as CMMs of RFMO/As,
may also trigger application of the Act. Once the Act offers a straight-
forward rule that makes the trade of fisheries taken in violation of
CMMs adopted by RFMO/As unlawful, the inclusion of a certain for-
eign-flagged vessel in an IUU list of a RFMO would automatically
trigger the Act. Consequently, the crew and owner of such vessel, and
U.S. nationals who trade in its catch, would be subject to investigation
under the Act.
Numerous RFMOs have databases of IUU fishing lists, which
contain the information of vessels that have presumably violated the
CMMs of a RFMO. Examples include: the Commission for the Conser-
vation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the International Com-
253. For a definition of conservation and management, see UNFSA, supra note 17, at
art. 1(b).
254. Id. at arts. 9 and 10 (addressing the objectives and functions of RFMO/As).
255. For a definition of arrangement, see id. at art. 1(d).
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mission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the Indian
Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Or-
ganisation (NAFO), the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission
(NEAFC), the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO),
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), South
Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO). In-
deed, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) often gathers
information from publicly available databases that include IUU vessel
lists of RFMOs.256
Since 2006, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Reauthorization Act has required the U.S. Secretary of
Commerce to submit a biennial report to Congress identifying nations
whose vessels were engaged in IUU fishing.257 The first biennial report
to Congress was submitted in 2009 and included six nations identified
by the NMFS as having been engaged in IUU fishing in the years of
2007 and 2008.258 Those nations were France, Italy, Libya, Panama,
People’s Republic of China, and Tunisia.259 In the following report, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, Ghana, Italy, Mexico, Panama, the Republic of Korea,
Spain, Tanzania, and Venezuela were identified.260 This year, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, and Mexico were identified again.261
These reports outline numerous IUU fishing incidents by for-
eign-flagged vessels that violated CMMs of RFMO/As, such as the ones
described in this paper. It is then further proposed that the Act or its
implementing regulations authorize the U.S. government to initiate
automatic proceedings against the owner of the foreign-flagged IUU
vessel and all U.S. nationals who trade in fisheries caught by vessels
identified by the NMFS as having violated CMMs of a RFMO or that
have been included in IUU list of RFMOs to which the U.S. is a
party.262
CONCLUSION
Several IUU fishing incidents in jurisdictional waters and adja-
cent high seas of three state parties to FTAs—Panama, Costa Rica,





261. NOAA FISHERIES, IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT FEBRUARY
2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS 23-26 (Feb. 2015), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/
msra_page/2015noaareptcongress.pdf.
262. Id.
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and Colombia—have occurred. Although the amount of IUU catch that
entered these markets cannot be determined, the probability that
these fish entered the U.S. market is high because these nations have
problems with law enforcement, non-cooperation, and lack of trans-
parency that prevent full traceability of their seafood imports.
Under the current international legal framework, it is difficult
to prevent these IUU fish from entering the markets of these three
nations, and with the current domestic mechanisms in place, the U.S.
could not verify that shipments of seafood from these nations did not
contain IUU fish. Yet, preferential tariffs in FTAs did not discriminate
between legally caught and IUU fish, so the IUU fish caught in the
incidents mentioned in this paper also enjoyed zero tariffs. On the
other hand, legal proceedings against the owners of all the foreign-flag-
ged IUU vessels and other market participants who traded in those
IUU fisheries have not been instituted, so future unlawful conduct has
not been deterred. Moreover, it is unclear whether these violations
would trigger the application of the Lacey Act.
The U.S. can take three actions to fight against trafficking in
IUU fisheries and to assure U.S. fishermen are able to distribute sea-
food to U.S. consumers at equal or better rates than competitors who
trade in IUU fisheries and enjoy zero tariffs. First, while foreigners are
subject to less stringent fishing requirements compared to the require-
ments the U.S. fishermen are subjected to, most of their catch enjoy
zero tariffs, so FTAs’ preferential tariffs to seafood should be granted
only to those importers who can prove the catch sought to be imported
has not undermined efforts to conserve fish stocks or jeopardized the
food supply and source of income of foreigner fishermen.
Second, tariffs could be used to compel state parties to FTAs to
enhance their port controls. Seafood is only one of the many goods that
enjoy zero tariffs. Since having preferential tariffs to other goods and
services is beneficial to other sectors of the economy, undertaking ac-
tivities under the cooperative environmental clauses of FTAs to
improve port controls would be less burdensome to state parties to
FTAs than losing preferential tariffs for all other goods and services.
Third, the U.S. can combat trafficking in IUU fisheries by imposing
civil and criminal penalties to any foreigner or U.S. national engaging
in the trade of IUU fish taken in violation of conservation and manage-
ment measures of RFMO/As. Accordingly, foreigners and U.S.
nationals who traded in IUU fish caught by the vessels identified by
the NMFS as having violated CMMs of the IATTC would be punished
automatically.
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These actions will prevent IUU fisheries from entering foreign
markets and will deter future trade in IUU fisheries. They are effective
measures to ensure sustainable use of marine resources and to balance
the market conditions of U.S. fishermen, so both foreign and U.S fish-
ermen may benefit.
